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In the public debate in the Netherlands the left-libertarian cultural revolution is increasingly denounced as the cradle of ‘gedogen’, i.e., refraining from legal action against rule violations, especially with respect to soft drugs. This assumes that primarily conservatives and constituencies of right-wing parties oppose the toleration of illegal activities. On the basis of a representative survey among the Dutch population (N=1.892) we have established that this assumption is untenable. Even though constituencies of right-wing political parties and conservatives are most likely to oppose toleration of rule violations in general, this does not imply that they also oppose most fiercely the toleration of specific rule violations. They do oppose rule violations by marginal individuals most often – i.e., unemployed workers defying their obligation to apply for a job and aliens remaining illegally in the Netherlands –, but they oppose the toleration of rule violations by official agencies least often – i.e., the toleration of noise pollution by airport Schiphol and the eavesdropping of police suspects without the formal approval of the examining judge. Hence, the connection between the Dutch ‘gedoog’ policy and the tolerant culture of the Sixties is wrong; there is no such thing as a general disapproval of tolerating refraining from legal action.
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Refraining from legal action against illegal activities – ‘gedogen’ – has been criticized heavily in the Netherlands during the last few years. This became manifest, for example, in the aftermath of two national disasters with many casualties both taking place in 2001: the firework disaster in Enschede and the fire in bar ‘t Hemeltje in Volendam. Disaster evaluations by the Commission Oosting respectively Alders showed violations of environmental, safety, fire and building regulations had been condoned and licenses had not been revoked. Both scrupulous evaluations pointed out that the toleration of illegal activities were not unique to both disasters, but represented a much more general phenomenon. Rule violations by other caterers and fire work factories were not only condoned as well, but the conclusion that rule violations were excused had also been drawn after a previous fire work disaster in Culemborg. The Commission Oosting pleaded for a ‘cultural revolution’ within public service driving back, among others, the toleration of illegal activities.
	This plea against toleration of illegal activities subsequently has become a hot issue for public debate in a much more general sense. Influential intellectuals of the public debate in the Netherlands, such as Paul Scheffer, Henk Hofland, Fred Teeven and the conservative Edmund Burke Stichting, expressed a negative attitude towards the toleration of illegal activities. These negative judgments were uncoupled from both disasters and formulated on a more abstract level and applied to other issues like soft drugs policy as well. Opposite these negative opinions individuals like Gijs van Oenen emphasized the advantages of this policy instrument. According to Van Oenen toleration of refraining from legal action enhances the feeling of responsibility of individual citizens in deciding what is acceptable behavior and what is not. This public resentment seemed to express a more general feeling of uneasiness at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Toleration of illegal activities seemed to provide a good reason to voice this uneasiness. Where did this uneasiness come from? Can the disapproval of tolerating illegal activities be conceived of as expression of an altered political climate? If so, how does this look like?


Two explanations for disapproval of tolerating illegal activities

General conservative opposition
Issues regarding enforcing social order have gained political attention in the Netherlands during the last decade and a half or so. Examples of this change are the increased attention for crime fighting, cultural assimilation of non-western migrants, banning of illegal aliens, and the revaluation of traditional norms and values. Ironically referring to Ingleharts’ (1977) influential theory on the left-libertarian ‘silent revolution’, that has taken place in western societies from the 1960s onwards, Ignazi (1992) rightly observes a just as remarkable conservative ‘silent counter revolution’ occurring since the 1980s (conform Veugelers 2000). Consequently, in politics issues with respect to economic redistribution between classes have been pushed to the background by cultural issues regarding the protection of individual freedom and the strengthening of the social order (Achterberg 2006; Houtman, Achterberg & Derks 2007).
According to historian Blom (cited by Righart 1995: 13) the turbulent sixties meant an even more important breaking point than the occupation during the Second World War. Youth from the middle class at the time uttered their discontent about the ‘bourgeois’, ‘technocratic’, and ‘capitalistic’ society, holding the individual in a suffocating grip. They demanded more freedom, democracy and room to maneuver for identities deemed before as ‘deviant’ (Roszak 1969; Zijderveld 1970; Inglehart 1977; Houtman 2004). These values have spread ever since, rendering traditional attitudes on the family, on the relationship between men and women and their (homo) sexuality an increasingly marginal existence (Middendorp 1991; Inglehart 1997). Consequently, in less than a quarter of a century, behavior perceived as ‘repulsive’ – homosexuality, divorce, cohabiting, unmarried motherhood, et cetera – became accepted across broader layers of the Dutch population (Duyvendak 2004).
Although the political turbulence of the sixties may have been settled to a large extent, ‘The cultural revolution (…) had continuous, uninterrupted, and lasting consequences’ (Marwick 1998: 802; conform Righart 1995) and the increased resistance against the left-libertarian convictions paradoxically underlines its huge discursive power: ‘The appearance (…) of (these) moralistic crusades simply testifies to the strength of the by now well-established behavior patterns which the crusades, vainly, hoped to eliminate’ (Marwick 1998: 802). Nonetheless, nowadays the values of the sixties are addressed less often benevolently as ‘a new frankness, openness, and indeed honesty in personal relations and modes of expression’ (Marwick 1998: 18), while, contrarily, ‘lack of self- discipline, (…) self- righteousness, (and) (…) anti- intellectualism’ are raised more often as ‘the least attractive features of the sixties generation’ (Bellah 1982: xi). In short, now the cry for strengthening the social order has become louder, the culture of the sixties becomes pathologized more often as the origin of an ‘indulgent’ culture responsible for many actual problems. 
While the progressive ideology was conceived of as a solution for feelings of societal discontent in the sixties, nowadays it is perceived basically an important cause of such feelings: ‘In contradistinction to the sixties, the discontent in democracy nowadays does not wear the mark of left-liberalism. On the contrary, the criticism focuses on the elite brought forth by the cultural revolution in those years’ (Scheffer 2002; conform De Jong 2000).​[1]​ Roel Kuiper, director of the Scientific Institute of the Christen Union considers the increased attention for norms and values a reaction to the ‘“freedom-happiness” individualism and the debasement of society in general’ and he also attributes these evils to the cultural revolution of the sixties: ‘Society has become freer, but less livable’. ‘Shedding the burden of social control, provincialism, and “churchlike narrow-mindedness” has been accompanied with the loss of more fundamental notions as well’ (CV-Koers 2002). The conservative Edmund Burke Society, no longer to be ignored in the Dutch political debate, has also turned its back to the ‘one-sided education in assertiveness and defending your personal interests, opinion, feelings, sentiments, and rights – the education that is the inheritance of the sixties and the seventies’ (2004: 23) and hence, against the ‘revolution of the sixties, bringing us political correctness, multiculturalism, and post modern value relativism’ (Edmund Burke Society 2004: 5).
However, increased aggression in the public sphere and decreased respect for authorities are not designated the only problematic inheritances of the permissive culture of the sixties (for example, Van den Brink 2001). The same happens to the ‘unacceptable aberrations’ of an uncontrolled policy of tolerance, especially in the domain of soft drugs and coffee shops selling soft drugs. ‘In the Netherlands, tolerating rule violations has transformed into a permanent state. (…) and the sustained avoiding of rules undermines the faith in elementary principles of law’. According to Paul Scheffer (2002), ‘refraining from taking legal action has reached a limit and renders society less free’. The conservative Edmund Burke Stichting states that ‘the legal force and the public prosecution must be freed of the soft mentality of the sixties that unfortunately seems to have these institutions in its grip’. And Fred Teeven, former celebrity of the right-populist party ‘Leefbaar Nederland’ and now member of Parliament for the liberal party, thought of his former party as a critique of the Dutch ‘permissive culture’ with its ‘political correctness’, ‘forest of negotiation organs and consultancy commissions’ and ‘eternal refraining from legal action’ (Hulshof & Verhey 2002: 54).
	In short, the sixties have increasingly been criticized and tolerating rule violations is deemed a part of its adverse consequences. However, it remains to be seen how justified this connection between the Dutch policy of tolerance and the permissive culture of the sixties is. Is this not too enthusiastic a generalization on the basis of the salient, albeit not automatically typical case of the policy concerning soft drugs and soft drugs selling coffee shops? Soft drugs have kept a ‘liberal’ image because they played an important role in the aspirations for liberation of the youth in the 1960s and 1970s. Hence, it is not surprising that soft drugs policy has a liberal image and is supported more in progressive than in conservative circles. But does this indicate a progressive support of tolerating refraining from legal action in general?

Content dependent opposition
In other words, is it conceivable that tolerating of illegal action with a conservative image is opposed by the other extreme of the political spectrum? This would imply the attitude of people with respect to tolerating non-compliance depends on the content of the illegal activity that is being tolerated. According to this explanation there is no such thing as a universal conservative dislike of refraining from legal action against illegal activities. Or is it indeed justified to conceive of tolerating illegal activities universally, hence, independent of which activity is actually tolerated, as a ‘typical progressive matter’ and so as a heritage of the left-libertarian culture of the sixties? We will answer this question by way of a systematic comparison of the manner in which groups with different positions on the political spectrum judge different toleration practices. In order to test this alternative explanation, the attitude towards tolerating illegal activities with a conservative and progressive image must be studied.
But what should actually be considered by conservatism and progressiveness? However the phenomenon is conceptualized, many sociologists and political scientists have tried to find out how political values are organized into one, two or even more dimensions – with notable resilient results. Since Lipset (1959) proposed that the working class is as progressive towards issues of economic distribution (egalitarian) as it is conservative when it comes to non-economic issues (authoritarian), numerous studies have demonstrated that there are in fact two separate ideological domains (compare Converse 1964; Evans, Heath & Lalljee 1996; Feldman 2003; Felling & Peters 1986; Fleishman 1988; Heath, Evans & Martin 1994; Kelly & Chambliss 1966; Middendorp 1991; Mitchell 1966; O’Kane 1970; Scheepers, Eisenga & Van Snippenburg 1992). Middendorp (1991: 76) rightly summarizes his own – and all other – findings on the subject as follows: ‘…the two values underlying most model elements …are those of freedom and equality: the former applied to the political socio-cultural domain; the latter applied to the socio-economic domain’. The first is defined as economic conservatism or progressiveness. It concerns the extent to what one is in favor of a restriction by the state of inequality resulting from the free market. The second type, cultural conservatism or progressiveness regards the extent to what one deems deviations of traditionally transmitted norms and values are acceptable. In the economic sphere, those who support economic redistribution by government are conceived of as progressive and those opting for a distribution based on the free market as conservative. In the cultural sphere, the progressive standpoint is represented by those who believe individuals ought to be free to follow their personal preferences and the conservative point of view by those who believe deviations from traditional norms and values are unacceptable.
Moreover, these two dimensions – an economic dimension of egalitarianism vs. laissez-faire and a cultural one of authoritarianism vs. libertarianism – are, according to these studies, totally unrelated to each other. Whether people favor economic equality and welfare state intervention has, generally speaking, nothing to do with their values on individual freedom or their opinions on a radical restoration of social order. According to this strand of research, egalitarian values are just as likely (or unlikely) to be combined with authoritarian values as with libertarian ones. In other words, knowing someone’s values on economic matters does not lead to a correct prediction of what one will think about cultural matters. There is no or very little coherence between the two value dimensions.
Since both political dimensions of the conservatism-progressiveness opposites are not automatically mutually related, it is important to distinguish them. We have done so by studying not only the public opinions on the acceptability of tolerating illegal action in general, but also of kinds of tolerating illegal activities which are illustrative of the progressive and conservative extremes of the economic and cultural political domain. We have operationalized these attitudes by referring each time to another actor breaking rules. With respect to the economic domain we have distinguished between an actor with a weak and a strong economic position. The actor with a weak economic position concerns an unemployed citizen aged above 55 defying his or her obligation to apply for a job. We deliberately chose an elder unemployed worker, because in the Netherlands it is repeatedly debated whether or not it is desirable to oblige elder unemployed workers to look for a job since it is already difficult for young unemployed workers to find one. The actor with a strong economic position concerns airport Schiphol transgressing norms of noise pollution. With respect to the cultural dimension we have distinguished between an marginal individual and an official institution, i.e., an illegal alien respectively the police eavesdropping on a suspect without the permission of the examining judge. Hence, based on Donald Black’s (1976) morfological dimension of social space we have opposed a marginal to a central social actor.

Hypotheses
If there exist a universal conservative disapproval of tolerating refraining from legal action, then conservatives in cultural or economic respect not only are more opposed to tolerating illegal activities in general, but also to all four specific kinds of tolerating (hypothesis 1).
If, however, opposition to tolerating illegal activities is dependent on the actor commiting them, then conservatives are not automatically more opposed to illegal activities than progressives. More specific, as regards the cultural domain authoritarians ought to be most likely to disapprove of illegal aliens because they want to protect institutions from marginal individuals breaching norms (hypothesis 2a), while libertarians ought to be most likely to oppose eavesdropping police suspects because they want to protect powerless individuals from official institutions interfering with private life (hypothesis 2b). With respect to the economic domain, laissez faire adherents ought to be most likely to oppose unemployed workers defying their obligation to look for a job because they are most likely to consider income protection an intolerable breach of the free market (hypothesis 2c), while then egalitarians ought to be most likely to oppose to the violation of noise pollution norms by airport Schiphol, because they are most inclined to restrict the free market (hypothesis 2d).
Moreover, since opinions on freedom and equality have proven to be totally unrelated to each other, cultural ideological embeddedness (i.e., libertarianism versus authoritarianism) ought not to affect opposition to both types of tolerating illegal activities pertaining to the strength of the economic position of the deviant actor – i.e., an unemployed worker respectively airport Schiphol – (hypotheses 3a and 3b), while economic ideological embeddedness (egalitarianism versus laissez faire) ought not to affect both types of tolerating illegal activities pertaining to the respectability of the cultural position of the actor profiting from it – i.e., illegal alien respectively illicit  eavesdropping by the police (hypotheses 3c and 3d).







In order to test the hypotheses, we used data that were collected in 2005 in the Netherlands. The data collection was done using Centerdata’s panel (University of Tilburg), which is representative of the Dutch population aged 18 years and older. Panel members fill out questionnaires of social scientists on a regular basis by means of an internet connection made available by Centerdata. A total of 2,665 individuals were selected to participate in the study of which 1,892 respondents completed the questionnaire, giving a response rate of 71 per cent.
Women, young and the poorly educated people are somewhat underrepresented. We have decided not to correct for this by mechanically applying a weighting procedure, because the deviations from the population are only marginal, because the application of weights may worsen rather than solve the problem of bias and because none of our hypotheses relates to gender, education or age.

Measurement
To measure tolerance of not taking legal action against illegal activities we used one general and four specific questions. Regarding former question respondents were asked ‘What is your attitude towards tolerating illegal activities in general?’, with the frequency distribution in percentages in brackets: 1. very negative (6.2), 2. negative (37.2), 3. neither negative nor positive (42.7), 4. positive (11.0), 5. very positive (0.1), 6. I don’t know (2.8). With respect to the specific questions, respondents were asked, ‘What do you think of the following activities?’ with the frequency distribution in percentages in brackets:
1.	Tolerating noise pollution by airport Schiphol: 1. very wrong (12.5), 2. wrong (37.9), 3. neither wrong nor right (26.7), 4. right (16.5), 5. very right (3.3), 6. I don’t know (3.1).
2.	Tolerating illegal residence in the Netherlands: 1. very wrong (28.5), 2. wrong (44.3), 3. neither wrong nor right (17.1), 4. right (7.0), 5. very right (1.5), 6. I don’t know (1.6).
3.	Tolerating eavesdropping of police suspects without the formal approval of the examining judge: 1. very wrong (12.3), 2. wrong (29.1), 3. neither wrong nor right (20.0), 4. right (26.3), 5. very right (10.7), 6. I don’t know (1.6).
4.	Tolerating unemployed citizens aged above 55 defying their obligation to apply for a job: 1. very wrong (5.7), 2. wrong (20.0), 3. neither wrong nor right (26.0), 4. right (31.7), 5. very right (13.8), 6. I don’t know (2.9).
Political party preference was measured with a question into the political party that one would vote for ‘if parliamentary elections would be held tomorrow’. Following Budge and Klingemann (2001), the Christian-Democratic (CDA) (13.2 per cent), Orthodox-Christian (SGP, ChristenUnie) (6.4 per cent), Conservatives (VVD) (10.7 per cent) and Rightist-Populist (LPF, Groep Wilders) (5.3 per cent) parties are treated as conservative and the Liberal-Democratic (D66) (3.6 per cent), Social-Democratic (PvdA) (19.0 per cent), Socialist (SP) (9.7 per cent) and Green (GroenLinks) (8.7 per cent) parties as progressive.​[2]​
	Authoritarianism (versus libertarianism) was measured with seven items, selected from a short version of the classical F-scale (Adorno et al. 1950), that together constitute a reliable scale (Cronbach’s α = 0.73). We asked respondents to indicate whether they agreed (1. disagree strongly, 2. disagree, 3. neither disagree nor agree, 4. agree, 5. agree strongly, 6. don’t know) with the following statements, with the percentage ‘agree (strongly)’ and the loading on the first factor in brackets:
1.	‘Because of the many opinions on good and bad, it is not clear what to do’ (21.1; 0.71).
2.	‘If people would talk less and work harder, everything would improve’ (32.0; 0.65).
3.	‘There are two kinds of people: strong and weak’ (20.8; 0.64).
4.	‘Most people are disappointing once one gets to know them better’ (10.9; 0.64).
5.	‘Our social problems would largely be solved when we could expel criminals, anti-socials, and morons from society in one way or the other’ (13.5; 0.59).
6.	‘Because of fast changes, it is difficult to know what is good and bad’ (25.4; 0.56).
7.	‘What we need are less laws and institutions and more brave, never-ceasing, and devoted leaders in whom the people can have confidence’ (54.8; 0.54).
To measure egalitarism (versus a laissez faire attitude) we used four items that were previously used by Houtman (2003). Respondents were asked to what degree they agreed (1. strongly disagree, 2. disagree, 3. neither disagree nor agree, 4. agree, 5. strongly agree, 6. don’t know), with the percentage ‘agree (strongly)’ and the loading on the first factor in brackets:
1.	‘The state should make social benefits higher’ (25.6; 66.0).
2.	‘Large income differences are unfair because in essence everyone is equal’ (40.2; 86.2).
3.	‘The state should interfere to reduce income differences’ (47.3; 89.5).
4.	‘Companies should be obliged to allow their employees to share in the profits’ (56.7; 65.5).
Age, gender, net household income and education are included as additional controls because ‘available research suggests that females, the young, and the educated are generally most lenient with respect to deviance’ (Cullen et al. 1985: 312; see, however, Schwartz, Guo & Kerbs 1993: 11; McCorkle 1993: 243). Age is measured in years, ranging from 18 through to 91 and 51.6 per cent of the respondents are male and 48.4 female. Net household income is measured in Euros, ranging from 0 to 129,182, with an average income of 2,150. The highest completed level of education has been coded into six ordinal categories in percentages: 1. primary education (5.1); 2. lower secondary education (26.7); 3. higher secondary education (13.8); 4. intermediary tertiary education (20.4); 5. college (23.3); and 6. university (10.7).


Disapproval of tolerating of illegal activities

This study has established in three different ways that there is no such thing as a universal rejection of tolerating illegal activities. The figures in table 1 show that disapproval of tolerating illegal activities in general is correlated much stronger with dislike of aliens remaining illegally in the Netherlands (r=0.33; p<0.001) as well as unemployed workers defying their obligation to apply for a job (r=0.35; p<0.001),  than with disapproval of the toleration of noise pollution by airport Schiphol (r=0.16; p<0.001), while the general attitude towards tolerating illegal activities is totally  uncorrelated to the disapproval of eavesdropping of police suspects without formal approval of the examining judge (r=0.04; not significant). The latter finding means that somebody disapproving of illegal activities in general is just as likely to oppose or support toleration of illicit eavesdropping by the police. These four correlations show the disapproval of tolerating illegal activities in general complements the dislike of tolerating illegal activities by marginal individuals to a much larger extent than when it concerns official institutions.

– Insert table 1 about here –

The other correlations confirm that the attitude towards tolerating illegal activities by official institutions differs fundamentally from those committed by marginal individuals. Opposition to aliens remaining illegally in the Netherlands is positively correlated to opposition of unemployed workers defying their obligation to look for a job (r=0.15; p<0.001), while it is unrelated to tolerating noise pollution by airport Schiphol (r=0.04; not significant). Opponents of illegal aliens are even inclined to support instead of oppose eavesdropping of police suspects without the formal approval of the examining judge (r=-0.08; p<0.001). Moreover, Dutch people disapproving of unemployed workers defying their obligation to apply for a job tend to dislike illegal residence of aliens more than Schiphol causing noise pollution (r= 0.15; p<0.001 respectively r=0.10; p<0.001), while they are not even inclined to dislike of eavesdropping of police suspects without formal approval of the examining judge (r=0.06; not significant). Finally, disapproval of Schiphol causing noise pollution is strongly correlated to dislike of illicit eavesdropping by the police (r=0.29; p<0.001).
	The second indication there is no such thing as a universal disapproval of tolerating illegal activities can be derived from table 2. Tolerating illegal activities in general and tolerating illegal aliens and unemployed workers defying their obligation to look for a job especially encounters opposition of the constituencies of conservative political parties (i.e., Christian Democrats, Conservatives, Orthodox Christians, Rightist Populists), while toleration of noise pollution by Schiphol and of illegal eavesdropping by the police is especially opposed by the constituencies of progressive political parties (i.e., Liberal Democrats, Social Democrats, Socialists, Greens). The only two exceptions are the Rightist populists who dislike unemployed workers defying their obligation to look for a job to a slightly lesser extent than average (mean=2.71 versus total mean=2.72), while the constituency of the Liberal Democrats oppose these unemployed workers more than average (mean=2.90 versus total mean=2.72). In sum: disapproval of tolerating rule violations by marginal individuals is typical of the constituencies of conservative parties, while disapproval of refraining from legal action against rule violations by official agencies is typical of the constituencies of progressive parties.


– Insert table 2 about here –


Finally, the figures in table 3 show that authoritarians as well as laissez faire adherents are most likely to oppose tolerating illegal activities in general and of rule violations by marginal individuals – i.e., illegal aliens and unemployed workers –, while libertarians and egalitarians are most likely to disapprove of tolerating illegal activities by official agencies – i.e., airport Schiphol and the police. These effects have been established when controlling for age, net household income, gender and level of education. This means that although it is often assumed that toleration of illegal action is disfavored more by the constituencies of conservatives parties and authoritarians than by the constituencies of progressive parties and libertarians, this study has demonstrated there is no such thing as a universal conservative disapproval of tolerating illegal activities. Hypothesis 1 has proven false.
Furthermore, hypotheses 2 and 4a cannot be dismissed. As expected authoritarians are most likely to disapprove of illegal activities in general as well as of illegal aliens and least likely to disapprove of eavesdropping by the police, while egalitarians are most likely to oppose noise pollution by Schiphol and least likely to dislike unemployed workers defying their obligation to look for a job.
Finally, hypotheses 3 and 4b have proven wrong as well. Contrary to this expectation, authoritarians are also most inclined to disapprove of unemployed workers defying their obligation to look for a job and least to disapprove of Schiphol causing noise pollution, while egalitarians are least likely to dislike illegal aliens as well as illegal activities in general and most likely to disapprove of police eavesdropping. This implies that cultural ideological embeddedness influences the toleration of illegal activities pertaining to the economic domain, while economic ideological embeddedness impacts the toleration of illegal activities pertaining to the cultural domain. In other words, although there is no such thing as a general conservative opposition to tolerating illegal activities, there seems to be a general conservative opposition to tolerating illegal activities by marginal individuals and a general progressive opposition to tolerating illegal activities by official institutions.
In contradistinction to other research, this implies the economic and cultural political domain are not always independent and we are not the first to conclude this. Although there is no or very little coherence between the two value dimensions among the general public, there are important differences in value coherence between social strata. For example, there is more value coherence among political elites as well as the higher educated (Achterberg & Houtman 2009). In the case of these groups, egalitarian values on the economic domain coherently go together with libertarian ones on the cultural domain, while laissez-faire values on the former ‘logically’ go together with authoritarian ones on the latter. When it comes to tolerating illegal activities value coherence between both dimensions even exists among the general public. This finding asks for further research into the variation of value coherence between the economic and cultural domain.







In a general sense the increased disapproval of tolerating illegal activities in recent years can be conceived of as an indication of a silent counter revolution favored especially in conservative circles. Herein toleration of illegal activities is perceived as a symptom of numerous order problems attributed to the left-libertarian revolution taking place from the end of the sixties to the middle of the eighties. During this silent counter revolution the enforcement of rules and regulations is no longer deemed an option the state can use if it suits her, but an obligation that must be met under all circumstances. At the same time the attitude of the Dutch public occurs to be clearly context bound. Tolerating illegal activities by marginal individuals is especially denounced by the constituency of right-wing political parties and authoritarians, while they are most permissive regarding the toleration of illicit activities by official agencies. Hence, on the one hand, there is no such thing as a universal disapproval of tolerating illegal activities. On the other hand, public opinions on tolerating illegal activities is not haphazard either: after all, a general conservative disapproval of tolerating illegal activities by marginal individuals seems to exist just as a general progressive opposition to illegal activities by official agencies. 
	Is this conclusion of any scientific relevance? That seems to be the case. In public opinion polls on enforcement instruments, hardly any attention is being paid to the importance of the objects of these instruments. This does not only pertain to the policy of ‘gedogen’, but also to crime figthing by repression and rehabilitation. Some attention is being paid to the impact of the abstraction level of the measurement of attitudes towards both kinds of crime fighting on research findings. Several findings have established that the more concrete and detailed crime cases are made to the public in surveys the less severe they judge them. In this case the most important difference is that on average the more ‘realistic’ cases are described the less favorable opinions are towards repression while the converse is true with respect to rehabilitation (Roberts & Stalans 1997; Cullen, Fisher & Applegate 2000: 61; Hutton 2005: 246-250; De Keijser, Van Koppen & Elffers 2006), but this does not mean a certain population category favors each kind of crime fighting in the one instance and disfavors it in the other. Yet, at least one other study has shown that public opinions on repression are context dependent. Kemmers et al.(2007) have established that people with a strong economic position take a positive stance towards the repression of welfare fraud, while they denounce the repression of tax fraud because of their laissez faire attitude. So, in this case the target of repression also determines whether or not people with a strong socio-economic position judge positive or negative on repression. This implies there are also other studies pointing out so far universal public opinions on enforcement instruments are too easily assumed. More systematic research into the influence of objects of enforcement could show the meaning of other enforcement instruments cannot be established either without taking into account the content to what they refer. For example, one could think of differences in public opinions on counter terrorism against animal liberation activists, right extremists, or radical Muslims, or on applying the precautionary principle to nuclear energy respectively child adoption policy.
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Table 1. Correlations between disapproval of tolerating illegal activities in general and of tolerating four specific types of illegal activities (N between brackets).

	General 	Illegal alien	Not looking for a job by unemployed worker	Noise pollution by airport Schiphol	Eavesdropping by police







Table 2. Disapproval of tolerating illegal activities in general and of tolerating four specific types of illegal activities explained by political party preference (Frequencies, means).a

Party preference	Frequencies %	General	Illegal alien	Not looking for a job by an unemployed worker	Eavesdrop-ping by police	Noise pollution by airport Schiphol
ConservativeChristian Democrats ConservativesOrthodox ChristiansRightist PopulistsProgressiveLiberal DemocratsSocial DemocratsSocialistsGreens	17.114.08.46.84.724.812.811.4	3.523.743.793.583.293.213.263.26	4.044.224.004.533.723.683.843.46	2.982.962.832.712.902.542.392.64	3.263.023.393.093.483.513.784.02	2.932.852.792.583.263.253.503.67
Total mean		3.41	3.90	2.72	3.45 	3.13
NR2 (main effect party)1R2 (including covariates)2	100.0	1,4176.9*12.2*	1,4299.2*10.7*	    1,4123.5*5.3 *	 1,4098.6*10.8* 	    1,4286.9*6.4*

1. R2 denotes the percentage of the differences in the dependent variable that can be attributed to party preference;






Table 3. Disapproval of tolerating illegal activities in general and of tolerating four specific types of illegal activities explained.


















^1	  We have translated all Dutch quotations into English.
^2	 . The remaining response categories are treated as missing values: Other (namely: ‘Blank’, ‘Party for Elderly’, ‘Party for Animals’, ‘Peter R. de Vries’ or ‘Van Buitenen’) (0.8 per cent), ‘I would not vote’ (3.5 per cent), ‘I am not allowed to vote’ (0.7 per cent) and ‘I do not know (yet)’ (18.6 per cent).
